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outh Africa￿s unacceptably low living standards have 
forced the government to attach great importance to its 
social security system. In 2000 the Department of 
Social Development commissioned the Taylor Committee to 
investigate the system￿s merits and shortcomings. One of the 
principal conclusions of the report is that existing social 
security programs inadequately address poverty. To close 
gaps in the system and encourage a better take-up of the 
available grants, the committee recommended comprehen-
sive reform and the introduction of a basic income grant 
(BIG). 
This universal grant would amount to R100 (US$10) per 
month, which would be paid to individuals in addition to any 
existing government transfers. Though the proposed phase-in 
would start with children under age 18, the transfer would 
eventually be made available to all South Africans regardless 
of age or income level. Such a policy move would make 
South Africa the first African welfare state.  
 
The Basic Income Grant Debate 
Three-quarters of adults and children in South Africa are not 
even indirect beneficiaries of the current social security 
system. Therefore a BIG of R100 per month represents a 
substantial increase in existing per capita transfers, and could 
help close the poverty gap by reaching the 13.8 million 
poorest South Africans who do not receive any form of 
social assistance. The anticipated benefits include increased 
productivity, increased supply of (and demand for) labor, and 
increased economic growth. Given that the BIG is equal to 5 
percent of GDP, the ability of the grant to generate the above 
impacts is important, as long-term economic growth would 
certainly be needed to lessen its fiscal burden.  
The magnitude of this spending has raised serious 
debate as to whether the country can afford the grant. 
Financing options include raising sales and income taxes, 
and reducing government spending on other policies. Given 
both the scale of the BIG and the contention surrounding its 
financing, this paper tries to 
assess which financing options 
are most feasible and what the 
impact of the grant and the 
suggested financing package 
will be on the South African 
economy. 
 
The Model and the Data 
This paper uses a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model for South Africa to determine the macroeconomic 
impact of implementing and financing a basic income grant. 
The model distinguishes between various institutions in the 
economy, including households, firms, the government, and 
the rest of the world. Each sectors￿ production, which is 
distinct from their produced commodities, combines the 
various factors and intermediates so as to maximize profit. 
Returns to these factors are paid to households who save 
their income or purchase consumer goods under utility 
maximization. Savings from institutions determine the level 
of investment in the economy.  
South Africa is assumed to be a price-taker in 
international markets, and imperfect substitution is assumed 
between domestic and both imported and exported com-
modities. It is also assumed that the exchange rate is free to 
adjust and that the country is unable to increase foreign 
borrowing in order to finance the grant.  
The model contains a complex system of prices and 
taxes. The government generates income through sales and 
import taxes on marketed commodities, and direct taxes on 
households and enterprises. The government spends this 
income on recurrent purchases, foreign borrowing, and 
transfers to households. 
The BIG represents an increase in government transfers 
to households. In this paper it is assumed that the govern-
ment cannot increase the budget deficit in order to finance 
the grant. According to the current policy debate, the 
government must therefore either increase sales or direct 
taxes, or decrease recurrent expenditure. This paper assesses 
the macroeconomic and distributional impact of each of 
these three financing options.  
 
Results: Financing a Universal Grant in South Africa 
Financing Through Increased Indirect Commodity Taxes. 
The first simulation finances the BIG solely through an 
increase in sales taxes on commodities. The impact of raising 
(already regressive) sales tax rates by the necessary 3.8 
percentage points drives consumer prices up significantly. 
This negative impact on real household consumption 
spending is partially offset by the universal transfer from 
government to households. Moreover, low-income house-
holds benefit more from the transfer, since they comprise a 
larger proportion of the 
population receiving the BIG. 
On the other hand, since low-
income households have 
lower savings rates, the shift 
in income toward these house-
holds reduces the overall level 
of real savings in the econ-
omy, which forces a decline in 
real investment spending, a shift away from investment, and 
a reduced level of import demand. The overall impact of the 
grant is a fall in real factor returns and employment and a 
reduction in real GDP of 0.8 percent. 
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Financing Through Increased Personal and Corporate Tax 
Rates. The next simulation evaluates the impact of the BIG if 
it were financed through an increase in direct tax rates on 
both households and enterprises. The initial impact of the 
additional transfer to households would raise the level of real 
private consumption. However, to maintain the budget defi-
cit, the government is forced to raise revenue by increasing 
direct tax rates on domestic institutions by an average 4.4 
percentage points. This resulting decrease in household 
disposable income partially offsets the increase in real 
consumption. The reduction in income in higher income 
households reduces the level of savings in the economy and 
decreases investment spending. This shift out of investment 
toward private consumption leads to an increase in demand 
for commodities purchased by low-income households. This 
change in the distribution of production leads to increased 
employment for unskilled labor and an increase in real factor 
returns for capital. Ultimately the BIG under this financing 
option has a small positive effect on GDP, which increases 
by 0.1 percent.  
 
Financing Through Decreased Government Consumption 
Spending. A further financing option involves a shift in 
government spending toward transfers to households. As in 
the previous simulations, the initial impact of the grant is to 
raise private consumption demand. However, this increase is 
not offset by a reduction in private consumption￿rather, the 
government reduces its consumption expenditure by 20.2 
percent. Real private consumption increases, thus raising 
domestic production and exports. 
Because the government carries the financing burden, 
there is less impact on the real consumption levels of high-
income households. There is also a dampening of the 
redistribution effect on lower income households￿ real 
consumption, since government consumption spending, now 
reduced, is one of the largest employers of unskilled and 
semiskilled labor. Ultimately, there is a decline in real GDP 




A Financing Package. Each modeled financing option places 
significant pressure on various institutions within the South 
African economy. Since no individual option is likely to be 
economically or politically feasible on its own, the final 
simulation investigates the impact of a ￿balanced approach￿ 
that spreads the cost evenly over sales and income taxes and 
government consumption spending. 
By removing the dependence on increased sales taxes, 
private consumption demand is not reduced by a rise in the 
consumer price index. The forced increase in the direct tax 
rates on households and enterprises is also lessened. 
Although there is no change in the distribution of the burden 
of the additional direct taxes, the distributional impact on 
real household consumption for higher income households is 
lessened. And while there is still a drop in employment, the 
overall negative effect is lessened through direct tax 
financing. Finally, while the scale of the grant remains 
unchanged, the burden of financing it is spread over domes-
tic institutions. Thus, this option appears to be more 
politically and economically feasible than the others.  
 
Conclusions 
This study simulated the impact of the BIG under several 
scenarios. The results suggest that most advocates of the BIG 
have underestimated the required increases in sales and 
income tax rates and that a reduction in government 
consumption expenditure could undermine other programs. 
Given these often-negative impacts, more research should be 
undertaken to determine if a universal grant is indeed better 
than other targeted programs. However, if it is decided that a 
BIG is preferable to other poverty-alleviation policies, then 
this paper suggests that the current debate should undertake 
more rigorous macroeconomic analysis, and shift its focus 
away from determining which individual financing option 
should be implemented towards acknowledging that a 
￿balanced￿ approach is likely to provide the only possible 
financing scenario. 
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